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Will North Carolina Vouch for Zelman? Examining the
Constitutionality of School Vouchers in North Carolina in the
Wake of Zelman v. Simons-Harris
June 7, 2002:
In what President Bush hailed as a "landmark
ruling" and a victory for the American family, the
Supreme Court Thursday ruled that a school voucher
program in Cleveland does not infringe upon the
constitutional separation of church and state.'
August 5, 2002:
Nearly one month after the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in favor of school vouchers and weeks before the
start of the school year, a Florida judge ruled Monday
the state's school voucher law is unconstitutional.2
With its recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,3 the
United States Supreme Court cleared the way for states to implement
private school voucher programs. While the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution sets the outer boundaries for
church-state relations, state courts may interpret their state
constitutions to require an even greater degree of separation.4 This
Recent Development argues that if a voucher program introduced in
North Carolina were to meet the criteria set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Zelman, it would likely survive scrutiny
under the North Carolina Constitution.' The program would stand
1. Terry Frieden, Supreme Court Affirms School Voucher Program, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/27/scotus.school.vouchers (June 27, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
2. Melanie Hunter, Florida Judge Rules Against School Vouchers, CNSNews.com, at
http://www.aclj.org/news/education/020806_vouchers.asp (Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
3. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4. The only example to date is Florida, which has declared a program factually
similar to the one in Zelman unconstitutional according to the state constitution. See
supra note 2; infra notes 28, 39-40 and accompanying text.
5. This Recent Development addresses only the constitutionality of vouchers at the
state level. Of course, there is still much debate on the policy implications of vouchers.
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for two reasons. First, North Carolina's constitution is more
permissive than the constitutions of other states that have already
struck down voucher programs (or are likely to strike down such
programs in the future). Second, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's prior decisions clearly indicate an adherence to the U.S.
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
To understand what type of program would be consistent with
Zelman, one must first understand the facts of the Cleveland plan that
the Court considered.6 The State of Ohio established the Cleveland
program in response to the realization that "Cleveland's public
schools were in the midst of a 'crisis that [was] perhaps
unprecedented in the history of American education.' ' '7 The program
provides two basic types of aid to parents: (1) tutorial aid for students
who choose to remain in public school8 and (2) tuition aid for students
in kindergarten through third grade (expanding each year through
See, e.g., Andrew J. Coulson, MythConceptions About School Choice, at
http://www.schoolchoices. org/roo/myths.htm (1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Private School Vouchers, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, at
http://www.nea.org/lac/papers/vouchers.html (June 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Private School Vouchers: Myth v. Fact, AMERICANS UNITED FOR
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, at http://www.au.org/vouch-bk.htm (2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). This Recent Development does not advocate for
or against a voucher plan. For a discussion of the constitutionality of vouchers in North
Carolina and suggestions for how policy makers and voucher opponents might avoid
educational programs that would provide public funding to parochial schools, see
generally Mary Elizabeth Hill Hanchey, Note, Resisting Efforts to Provide Public Funding
for Parochial Education in the Wake of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 1 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 85 (2003) (assuming that school vouchers are constitutional in North Carolina, but
concluding they are bad policy and presenting ideas for how policy-makers might work to
avoid a voucher program within the Zelman framework).
6. The Cleveland voucher program discussed in this Recent Development is set forth
in the Ohio Code. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.979 (West 2003). The
voucher program provides state assistance only to Ohio school districts that have been or
are "under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the
district by the state superintendent." See id. § 3313.975(A). According to the Zelman
Court, the Cleveland district was the only district that fell within the statutory provision.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645.
7. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644. The public school system in Cleveland was in such poor
shape that a federal district court declared a "crisis of magnitude" in 1995 and placed the
entire school district under state control. Id. At that time, only one in ten ninth graders
passed a basic proficiency exam and more than two-thirds of the students in the Cleveland
system either dropped out or failed out before graduation. See id. Even among the
graduating students, few could read or write at levels comparable to students from similar
Ohio school districts. See id.
8. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (West 2003). In the tutorial aid
portion of the program, parents arrange for registered tutors to provide assistance to their
children. The parents then submit receipts for such services to the state for
reimbursement. See id. § 3313.979(C).
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eighth grade) to attend a participating public or private school of their
parents' choosing.9 Notably, the private schools do not receive
voucher funds directly from the state. The participating child's
parents receive the tuition aid in the form of a check, which is
subsequently endorsed over to the public or private school of their
choosing.10
Of the 3,700 students who participated in the plan, however,
ninety-six percent chose to enroll in religiously affiliated private
schools. 1 For this reason, some Ohio taxpayers argued that the plan
violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 2 But in a
five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that this program was
constitutional. 3 In so doing, the Court observed that Ohio's program
was one of "true private choice," writing that:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to
religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious
schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is not readily
subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. 4
In its analysis of the Ohio plan, the Zelman Court emphasized
three criteria that made the program one of "true private choice": (1)
the program was neutral toward religion; 5 (2) any money going to
9. For program requirements governing participating public and private schools, see
generally sections 3313.976 through 3313.978 of the Ohio Code, listing, inter alia, rules for
funding, non-discrimination, and means testing.
10. See id. § 3313.979(C).
11. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647.
12. See id. at 648.
13. See id. at 644.
14. See id. at 652.
15. In reaching its conclusion that "the Ohio program [was] neutral in all respects
toward religion," the Court noted that there were "no 'financial incentive[s]' that 'ske[w]'
the program toward religious schools." See id. at 653 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986)). The Court also observed that the
program actually created "financial disincentives," noting the lower funding for private
schools and the fact that parents must still copay a portion of their child's tuition at private
schools, while parents who move their children to participating public schools pay nothing.
Id. at 654. The Zelman Court expressly stated, however, that these disincentives are not
necessary to a program's constitutionality, implying that this prong of the test does not
require the disincentives toward private schools that the Ohio program included. See id. at
654 (noting that such disincentive features are not the sine qua non of constitutionality
with regard to school vouchers, but they do clearly show that the program does not create
financial incentives for parents to choose religious schools). The Pew Forum on Religion
and the Public Life recently commissioned a team of distinguished constitutional and
educational law scholars to draft a joint statement explaining the constitutional principles
announced in Zelman. The scholars concluded that the neutrality requirement will be met
if the program simply avoids "terms that formally give aid in greater amounts, or under
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religious schools resulted from the decisions of individuals rather than
from direct payments made by the state;16 and (3) the program
offered parents genuine secular options for their children's
schooling. 7 Presumably, a program in another state meeting this
three-prong test 8 would be permissible under the U.S. Constitution. 9
Through the application of state constitutional provisions,
however, individual states can still reject a program that meets the
Zelman test. A Florida circuit court, for example, recently held that a
program similar to the Ohio plan was unconstitutional according to
the Florida Constitution.2 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has
not yet had the opportunity to make a ruling on school vouchers.2'
However, an examination of other state constitutions combined with
the Supreme Court of North Carolina's respect for the United States
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicates that a
program consistent with Zelman would be held constitutional in
North Carolina.
When compared to other state constitutions, the North Carolina
Constitution appears to allow a voucher program meeting the Zelman
test. An article written by Professor Frank Kemerer provides a useful
framework for making the comparison. Professor Kemerer classifies
all fifty states into three categories with respect to voucher
permissibility under the state constitutions.22 He labels each state as
more favorable criteria, to religious entities." PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC
LIFE, SCHOOL VOUCHERS: SETTLED QUESTIONS, CONTINUED DISPUTES 4 (2002)
[hereinafter PEW FORUM].
16. The Zelman majority sharply distinguished between programs that provide
government aid directly to religious schools and those programs in which government aid
reaches religious schools only as a result of "the genuine and independent choices of
private individuals." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649. The Cleveland program was one of "true
private choice," and the Zelman opinion is limited to programs of this type.
17. This three-prong analysis comes from PEW FORUM, supra note 15, at 4-5. In
determining that the Cleveland program provided genuine secular options for the parents
using the vouchers, the Court noted the availability of tutorial aid, the provision for
students to use adjacent public schools, and the availability of non-religious private
schools. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-48.
18. Hereinafter "the Zelman test."
19. See PEW FORUM, supra note 15, at 7.
20. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
5, 2002). For a discussion of the voucher program in Holmes, see infra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
21. In fact, the North Carolina General Assembly has never passed a school voucher
plan. See Helen F. Ladd, Claims for School Voucher Success in Florida Not Justified, at
http://www.pps.aas.duke.edu/centers/child/debate.html (2000) (stating "North Carolina...
doesn't have a voucher program.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
22. Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1
(1997). Other studies have reached the same or similar results. See, e.g., Emily F.
2422 [Vol. 81
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restrictive, permissive, or uncertain.23  The most restrictive state is
Michigan, which explicitly forbids vouchers.24 Other restrictive states
have constitutional provisions specifically forbidding any public aid
from going to support or benefit religious schools .2  The remainder of
the restrictive states have constitutional provisions prohibiting both
"direct" and "indirect" aid to sectarian private schools. 26  Taken
together, these "restrictive" states are the most likely to declare even
a Zelman-style voucher program unconstitutional.27
Thigpen, Public Vouchers and the Private School System, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 425,
427-29 (1999) (noting states with prohibitive and favorable climates for voucher programs
based on constitutional language and judicial precedent); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School
Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 127 (2000) (discussing the empirical
validity of Kemerer's classification scheme).
23. Kemerer, supra note 22, at 4.
24. The Michigan Constitution provides:
No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher,
subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided, directly or
indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any
person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where
instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students.
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
25. For example, the California state constitution provides:
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school
district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay
from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious
sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any school,
college, university, hospital, or other institution controlled by any religious creed,
church, or sectarian denomination whatever ....
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. Several other state constitutions contain very similar
prohibitions. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (forbidding any public money from
going towards the benefit of religiously affiliated schools); DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 3
(forbidding the use of public funds for the support of sectarian schools but allowing a
property tax exemption for any zero-tuition school); HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 (prohibiting
public funds from being appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or private school);
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 (prohibiting use of public funds for religious schools in virtually
identical language as the California constitution); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (stating "In
no case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for the support of
schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular Christian or
other religious sect are promulgated or taught."); MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (prohibiting
public funds from being appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or private school);
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (same); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (same); Wyo. CONST. art. 7,
§ 8 (same).
26. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (prohibiting public funds from being appropriated
for the benefit of any sectarian or private school); GA. CONST. art. I, § II, $ VII ("No
money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any
church, sect, cult, or religious denomination or of any sectarian institution."); MONT.
CONST. art. X, § 6 (prohibiting both "direct" and "indirect" state aid to sectarian private
schools); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (prohibiting both "direct" and "indirect" state aid to
sectarian private schools); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5 (same).
27. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 4-9, 15-18. Another commentator reached similar
results, finding that the courts in twelve states had indicated that their constitutional
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A court in Florida, for dxample, recently held that a specific
voucher program meeting the Zelman test was not constitutional
under the Florida Constitution.28 That program provided for voucher
funds to be transferred from the state treasury to a separate fund, the
"Opportunity Scholarship Fund," from which they were then
dispersed to the child's parents. 9 The parents of participating
children would then endorse the check over to the school." The
Florida court held this program unconstitutional because Article I,
Section 3 of the Florida Constitution states, "[n]o revenue of the state
or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from
the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or
religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution."3 The
court held that the program provided impermissible, "indirect" aid to
religious institutions.3"
Clearly, North Carolina does not fall into the restrictive state
category. Its constitution lacks the explicitly restrictive language of
the Michigan and Florida constitutions,33 and it does not specifically
restrict government aid from reaching religious schools.34 Restrictive
standards were stricter than those of the Establishment Clause in the United States
Constitution. See Heytens, supra note 22, at 127. North Carolina was not among these
states.
28. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
5, 2002).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38(f) (2002) ("[T]he Department of Education shall
transfer from each school district's appropriated funds the calculated amount from the
Florida Education Finance Program and authorized categorical accounts to a separate
account for the Opportunity Scholarship Program for quarterly disbursement to the
parents or guardians of participating students.")
30. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38(g) (West 2002).
31. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added).
32. See Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079, at *2.
33. Compare the language of restrictive state constitutions in notes 24-26, supra, and
36, infra, with the language of the North Carolina Constitution in notes 37-38, infra.
34. In fact, the North Carolina Constitution actually encourages religion in the
educational system. The section reads, "Education Encouraged. Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools,
libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." N.C. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1. Stated differently, "schools," "libraries," and other "means of education" are to
produce "religion, morality, and knowledge." Notably, religion is listed before knowledge
as an educational goal.
Further, Justice Thomas argues in Zelman that individual states should have more
latitude under the Establishment Clause. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
678-81 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). He argues that the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution was passed to protect individual rights and choices, not to restrict them.
Since the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First Amendment (which contains
both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause), Thomas states, "There
would be a tragic irony in converting the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
individual liberty into a prohibition on the exercise of educational choice." Id. at 680.
2424 [Vol. 81
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states have constitutional provisions that prohibit any public money
from benefiting religious schools.35  For example, the Montana
Constitution forbids "any direct or indirect appropriation or payment
from any public fund or monies" to be used to aid any school that is
"controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or
denomination. "36
In comparison, the only language in the North Carolina
Constitution that may be construed to restrict aid to private schools
comes from Sections 6 and 7 of Article IX and Section 2 of Article V.
Section 6 of Article IX mandates that certain funds being paid to the
state treasury for the purposes of public education must be "used
exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform system of free
public schools. '3 7 Section 7 of Article IX applies similar restrictions
on county school funds.3 8 Unlike states that have more restrictive
constitutional provisions, these provisions only forbid money from
the public education fund to go to purposes other than public
education. There is no prohibition on "any public fund" going to
religious schools. In fact, there is no mention of religious schools at
all. Though Sections 6 and 7 of the North Carolina Constitution may
prohibit private school voucher payments from money already given
to public schools, they clearly do not forbid such payments from a
separate fund that the legislature might create.
Some might further argue that a program like that which the
Florida court addressed in Holmes would violate the North Carolina
35. See supra notes 24-26 (detailing the provisions of restrictive state constitutions).
36. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6.
37. The full text of Section 6 reads as follows:
State School Fund. The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be
granted by the United States to the State, and not otherwise appropriated by this
State or the United States; all moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property
belonging to the State for purposes of public education; the net proceeds of all
sales of the swamp lands belonging to the State; and all other grants, gifts, and
devises that have been or hereafter may be made to the State, and not otherwise
appropriated by the State or by the terms of the grant, gift, or devise, shall be
paid into the State Treasury and, together with so much of the revenue of the
State as may be set apart for that purpose, shall be faithfully appropriated and
used exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform system of free public
schools.
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
38. The following is Section 7 in its entirety:
County School Fund. All moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging
to a county school fund, and the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures
and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws
of the State, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be
faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools.
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
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Constitution. But this program would likely be constitutional in
North Carolina as the language of Florida's constitution is more
restrictive than the language in North Carolina's constitution. In
making its decision to declare the voucher program unconstitutional
in Florida, the Holmes court based its decision specifically on that
state's constitutional prohibition of "indirect" aid to sectarian
schools.39 That decision likely would have been different if the word
"indirect" did not appear in the Florida Constitution, as is the case
with the North Carolina Constitution. 0 Like Holmes, the voucher
plan in Zelman was "indirect" as it first gave the funds to the parents,
then allowed them to choose the school. If the presence of the word
"indirect" was of such crucial importance to the Florida court's
holding in Holmes, then surely its absence from the North Carolina
Constitution suggests that this type of an indirect-aid voucher
program would be permitted under the North Carolina Constitution.
On a different note, Section 2 of Article V of the North Carolina
Constitution mandates that "[t]he power of taxation shall be
exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only
.... 42 One might argue that this language prohibits any taxes to be
imposed for the purpose of benefiting private schools. Education,
however, undeniably serves a "public purpose," whether received
from a public or a private school.43 In Brown v. Board of Education,"
for example, the United States Supreme Court determined that
education is "required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities," and is "the very foundation of good citizenship."45
Clearly, this section cannot be interpreted to conclusively prohibit the
application of a voucher program in North Carolina.
39. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, *1-3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
5,2002).
40. In fact, even with the express ban on using state education funds "indirectly" to
benefit sectarian schools, the case is still in debate. The trial court originally held the
program unconstitutional, but its decision was reversed by the Florida Court of Appeals.
See Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing the trial court's
determination that the Opportunity Scholarship Program was facially unconstitutional
according to Article 3, Section 1 of the Florida state constitution). On remand, the
plaintiff was granted summary judgment, which was upheld on appeal. See Holmes, 2002
WL 1809079, at *1.
41. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647-48 (2002).
42. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2.
43. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (holding "the grave
significance of education both to the individual and to our society cannot be doubted,"
even though it is not a fundamental right); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(discussing the importance of education).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. Id. at 493.
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Other states are more permissive.46 Of the permissive states,
four have no specific anti-establishment provisions. 47  Nine other
states suggest a welcome climate for school vouchers, as each
possesses "some combination of weak anti-establishment
constitutional provisions, strong free exercise provisions, the presence
of a constitutional override provision on restricting appropriations for
public education only, or supportive state supreme court
precedent."48  These states would likely find a voucher program
constitutional if it were to meet the Zelman test criteria.
North Carolina could potentially fall into the "permissive"
category. Most significantly, it has no Establishment Clause in its
state constitution.49 The North Carolina Constitution once contained
a specific provision for disestablishing the Church of England, 0 but
that section soon became unnecessary and was dropped in 1868.'
Today the state constitution "lacks a specific prohibition of 'an
establishment of religion,' such as in the First Amendment of the U.S.
Bill of Rights." 2 Secondly, there is little other restrictive language in
the North Carolina Constitution indicating that a voucher program
would be unconstitutional. As discussed above, Article IX, Sections 6
and 7, and Article V, Section 2, which place some restrictions on the
ways in which educational appropriations may be raised and spent,
might provide some basis to attack a program, but appear unlikely to
prohibit it.
Under Kemerer's analysis, the remaining states are "uncertain"
due to the presence of ambiguous constitutional terminology53 or the
lack of clear Establishment Clause precedent. 4 Additionally, Ohio
and Wisconsin were "uncertain" due to pending litigation.
However, both of these cases were subsequently resolved in favor of
46. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 20.
47. These states are Maine, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See id.
48. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia. See id. at 23. See also Heytens,
supra note 22 at 126-27 (noting that states are classified as " 'permissive' by Kemerer
either because their state constitution lacks a provision concerning church/state relations
or because of a supportive legal climate").
49. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 49 (1993).
50. See id. at 49.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. For a discussion of states with constitutional ambiguities, see Kemerer, supra note
22, at 27-30. These states include: North Carolina, New Mexico, Connecticut, New
Jersey, New Hampshire, Illinois, and Minnesota. See id.
54. These states include: Texas, Louisiana, Iowa, Oregon. See id. at 31-32.
55. See id. at 3-7, 27-28.
2003] 2427
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the voucher programs at issue.56
Professor Kemerer classified North Carolina as "uncertain"
because he thought the state likely would follow the Supreme Court's
lead.57 After the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman, we can predict
how the North Carolina courts will respond. Case law demonstrates
that the North Carolina courts strictly adhere to federal
Establishment Clause jurisprudence when addressing questions of
validity under the state constitution.58 This strongly indicates that the
North Carolina courts will follow the Zelman Court's application of
the Establishment Clause and uphold a program of this type under
the North Carolina Constitution.
The principal case on North Carolina's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship,
Inc. v. State.59 In Heritage Village, the court examined section 108-
75.7 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which was intended to
achieve " 'full public disclosure of facts relating to persons and
organizations who solicit funds from the public for charitable
purposes ..... "I To accomplish this, the statute required charitable
organizations to apply for a license from the Department of Human
Resources before soliciting donations within the state.6' The statute
specifically exempted religious organizations from this licensing
requirement, except for those groups receiving a majority of their
funding from donations.62 The plaintiff religious organizations, which
received a majority of their funds from donations and thus could not
claim the exemption, challenged this section as unconstitutional
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
and Sections 1, 13, 14, and 19 of Article I of the North Carolina
Constitution.63
56. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998) (holding that a school choice program did not violate the state
constitution's Establishment Clause provisions).
57. See Kemerer, supra note 22, at 2-8. The Supreme Court had not yet decided
Zelman at the time of the article's publication. See also Frank R. Kemerer, The
Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 155 n.116
(1998) (stating in an earlier article that the Supreme Court of North Carolina "has
explicitly indicated that the anti-establishment clause in the state constitution is
coextensive with the religion clauses of the First Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution]
58. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
59. 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
60. See id. at 401, 263 S.E.2d at 727.
61. See id. at 402, 263 S.E.2d at 728.
62. See id. at 403, 263 S.E.2d at 728-29.
63. Id. at 404-05, 263 S.E.2d at 729.
[Vol. 812428
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In its analysis, the Supreme Court of North Carolina showed its
proclivity for federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence in resolving
religious questions under the North Carolina Constitution. The court
first examined Article I, Section 13 of the North Carolina
Constitution, which states, "[a]ll persons have a natural and
inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
of their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case
whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience." 6  The
court also cited Article I, Section 19, which mandates that no person
shall be "subject to discrimination by the State because of... religion
.... ,65 After citing the Federal Establishment Clause, the court
continued by stating that, "[t]aken together, these provisions may be
said to coalesce into a singular guarantee of freedom of religious
profession and worship, 'as well as an equally firmly established
principle of separation of church and state.' ",66 In so doing, the court
appears to merge North Carolina's constitution with the United
States Constitution's Establishment Clause in its analysis.67
Going even further, the court wrote, "[wje proceed to examine
the Act for aspects of religious partiality. Since the contours of the
64. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
65. Id. § 19.
66. See Heritage Village, 299 N.C. at 406, 263 S.E.2d at 730 (quoting Braswell v.
Purser, 282 N.C. 388, 393, 193 S.E. 2d 90, 93 (1972)).
67. Both of the above-cited provisions of the North Carolina Constitution (Article I,
Sections 13 and 19) appear to deal more with the free exercise, rather than the
"establishment," of religion. In fact, the plaintiffs in Heritage Village challenged the law in
question under the "First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Sections 1, 13, 14 and 19 of Article I of the Constitution of North Carolina." Heritage
Village, 299 N.C. at 404, 263 S.E.2d at 729. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
includes the right to the "free exercise" of religion (as well as the prohibition of laws
intended to establish it) and Article I, Sections 13 and 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution have similar provisions. See U.S. CONST., amend. I. But in Heritage Village
the Supreme Court of North Carolina wrote:
We affirm the [North Carolina] Court of Appeals' holding that the partiality of
the qualified exemption provided by section 75.7(a)(1) works an unconstitutional
"establishment" of religion. That section's proviso, which excepts from the
general exemption those religious organizations which derive financial support
primarily from nonmembers, constitutes on its face a violation of Sections 13 and
19 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution and the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. Since the proviso cannot be
constitutionally applied to deny plaintiffs an exemption from the requirements of
the Act, we find no occasion to address or pass upon the merits of the other
holdings of the Court of Appeals.
Heritage Village, 299 N.C. at 405, 263 S.E.2d at 729 (1980). In other words, the court
specifically did not decide any other issues in this case but the question of whether the
disputed law "worked an unconstitutional 'establishment' of religion." The free exercise
of religion was simply not at issue in the case.
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neutrality requirement have been most thoroughly defined in the
jurisprudence of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, we
may usefully turn to that body of law for analytical guidelines."68
True to its word, the court proceeded to analyze the question of both
state and federal constitutionality by applying only United States
Supreme Court cases.69 It expressly recognized "that the neutrality
demanded by the First Amendment is also compelled by the
conjunction of Sections 13 and 19 of Article I" of the North Carolina
Constitution.70 The court does not suggest that the North Carolina
Constitution is more restrictive than the Federal Establishment
Clause. In fact, its analysis specifically stated that both are to be
treated the same.7'
Appeal of Springmoor, Inc.72 provides another example of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's fondness for the United States
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In
Springmoor, the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined a statute
granting tax exemptions to homes for elderly, sick, or infirm citizens
only if the homes were owned and operated by religiously affiliated
organizations.73  The court found this part of the statute
unconstitutional under the North Carolina Constitution and the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.74  The court
emphasized that, "although the language of our State constitution
differs from that of the federal constitution, the North Carolina
Constitution provides the same protection in Article I, section 13." 75
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the
North Carolina Court of Appeals and allowed severance of the
68. Id. at 406, 263 S.E.2d at 730.
69. See id. at 406-10, 263 S.E.2d at 730-732.
70. Id. at 406 n.1, 263 S.E.2d at 730 n.1.
71. See id. Another North Carolina case, State v. Pendleton, 339 N.C. 379, 451 S.E.2d
274 (1994), supports these statements from Heritage Village. In Pendleton, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina reversed a North Carolina Court of Appeals decision that held a
statute constitutional according to both the North Carolina and the United States
Constitutions. Id. at 383, 451 S.E.2d at 277. The lower court cited both state and federal
constitutional law in making its ruling. See State v. Pendleton, 112 N.C. App. 171, 173-
180, 435 S.E.2d 100, 102-06 (1993). The Supreme Court of North Carolina, however,
reversed the decision with an analysis of only federal law, stating that the program
violated the Federal Establishment Clause thus making an analysis of state constitutional
precedent unnecessary. Pendleton, 339 N.C. at 383-84, 451 S.E.2d. at 277.
72. 125 N.C. App. 184, 479 S.E.2d 795 (1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 348 N.C. 1,
498 S.E.2d 177 (1998).
73. See id. at 184, 479 S.E.2d at 797.
74. See id. at 190, 479 S.E.2d at 799.
75. Id. at 189, 479 S.E.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
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unconstitutional portion of the statute.76 More importantly, however,
the supreme court reinforced the lower court's application of federal
jurisprudence by affirming its application of the federal law.77 Justice
Lake (now Chief Justice) dissented in Springmoor, but even he did
not argue that federal precedent should be separated from the state
constitutional issue.7 8 Justice Lake argued that the lower court had
misinterpreted the federal cases' holdings.79 As shown by these cases,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina has historically exhibited a
strong desire to merge the state constitution's church-state provisions
with the federal Establishment Clause, and it is likely that it would
readily accept Zelman and allow a voucher program of that type to
operate in the state.
To summarize, a voucher program meeting the Zelman test
clearly would be constitutional in North Carolina. As to the issue of
indirect funding for sectarian schools, the North Carolina
Constitution is remarkably unrestrictive in comparison to other
states' constitutions. Additionally, the North Carolina court's strong
tendency to follow federal precedent on the Establishment Clause
when addressing questions of state permissibility indicates that the
Zelman decision would be fully embraced.
As a practical matter, state legislators considering a voucher
program in North Carolina should make it conform to the Zelman
test to ensure that the program could withstand a constitutional
challenge. Additionally, they should ensure that funding comes from
a source other than the public school fund to avoid potential
problems with Article IX, Sections 6 and 7 of the North Carolina
Constitution."° If a constitutional challenge is raised, attorneys
seeking to defend such a program should focus on the state's
constitution's textual permissiveness and the rule of Heritage
Village.1
Attorneys attacking a North Carolina voucher program, on the
other hand, should attempt to demonstrate a lack of "true private
choice," as defined by the Zelman Court, in order to invalidate a
private school voucher program in North Carolina. Given the
permissive language of the North Carolina Constitution and the
existing judicial precedent, however, this argument will likely fail. As
76. See Appeal of Springmoor, Inc., 348 N.C. 1, 15, 498 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1998).
77. See id. at 12, 498 S.E.2d at 184.
78. See id. at 20, 498 S.E.2d at 188 (Lake, J., dissenting).
79. See id.
80. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
81. 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
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a second point of attack, attorneys could focus their efforts on
distinguishing the facts of the hypothetical program from those of
Zelman. These opponents might argue that the Zelman program was
appropriate only because Cleveland was experiencing a severe
educational crisis in its public schools. According to such a theory,
since North Carolina is not experiencing such a crisis,82 a voucher
program would be unconstitutional.
Further, opponents could make strong policy arguments against
voucher programs. Some studies show that the primary problem in
failing schools is a lack of resources-a problem that vouchers could
potentially exacerbate by taking needed money away from disfavored
schools.83 Former North Carolina Governor James Hunt made a
similar point when he argued that vouchers ignore the vast majority
of children who would remain in public schools when private school
vouchers are exercised.84 Governor Hunt cites a study showing that
with the advent of vouchers, "the worst schools grew worse."85
Notwithstanding these policy implications, the law seems clear that a
voucher program meeting the Zelman test would be held
constitutional in North Carolina.
DAVID BRYAN EFIRD
82. In fact, North Carolina public schools are improving without vouchers. See Ladd,
supra note 21 (showing that North Carolina school systems, which operate without
vouchers, have attained levels of success comparable to those achieved by Florida school
systems with voucher programs).
83. See Rob Boston, Supreme Mistake, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE, at http://www.au.org/churchstate/cs7021.htm (Aug. 26, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
84. See James B. Hunt, The Voucher Chorus is Off Key, FLORIDIANS FOR SCHOOL
CHOICE, at http://www.floridians.org/newsf/00/092000.html (Sept. 20, 2000) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
85. Id. Of course, additional policy arguments exist on both sides of the debate.
Whether a voucher program is desirable from a policy perspective, however, is beyond the
scope of this Recent Development.
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